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Abstract 
This paper analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules 
have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a 
group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970-2005 to 
analyse this issue. Panel estimations using fixed-effects, pooled mean group and system-
GMM estimators show that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union 
after 1992 were not harmful to growth. Moreover, results show that growth is slightly higher 
in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially 
assessed, i.e. after 1997. 
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1. Introduction 
To create an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe, the members of the 
European Union (EU) agreed to lose independence over both monetary policy and exchange 
rate. They also agreed that fiscal policy should be kept in the hands of national governments 
and that rules to avoid excessive deficits should be put in place. Those rules were considered 
necessary because governments’ temptation to create budget deficits to absorb negative 
shocks in an EMU could lead to problems of sustainability of those deficits and to growing 
government debts. There could also be negative spillovers for other EU states, and price 
stability policy of the Central Bank could be undermined. In particular, a country that allows 
its debt-GDP ratio to increase continuously could force the EU interest rate upwards, which 
would increase the burden of government debts in the other countries and would force them to 
follow more restrictive fiscal polices to stabilize their debt-GDP ratios. This might also 
compel countries to pressure the European Central Bank (ECB) to relax its monetary stance, 
which could endanger the stability of prices in Europe. These considerations led to the 
definition in the Maastricht Treaty of numerical budgetary rules that countries have to satisfy 
in order to take part in EMU: the 3% of GDP deficit rule and the 60% of GDP debt rule. 
These same rules were later reinforced in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for countries in 
EMU, in order to avoid the problems mentioned above. 
Thirlwall (2000), Arestis et al. (2001), Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006), among 
others, have argued that, despite the justification for fiscal rules in an EMU without a 
centralised budget, EU fiscal rules may have undermined economic growth in Europe. They 
consider that those rules reduce the margin of manoeuvre of the member countries when 
facing asymmetric shocks and, as a result, they are not growth promoting. Despite these 
 3 
theoretical considerations, very few empirical contributions exist to sustain or refute the idea 
that EU fiscal rules can be harmful to growth.1 
This paper contributes to this literature by evaluating empirically the impact of EU 
fiscal rules on economic growth. Some improvements relative to previous empirical works are 
implemented, to overcome some perceived limitations. In particular, we employ a proper 
growth equation and a different method of estimation (pooled mean group estimation). 
Moreover, we use a dummy variable for the period in which fiscal rules started to be officially 
assessed and develop a new indicator to test directly for the impact of the EU fiscal rules on 
growth. Finally, we also provide a cross-comparison between EU and non-EU countries. 
Contrary to the theoretical and the few empirical studies on this issue, the results presented in 
this paper do not support the contention that fiscal rules have damaged growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
on the EU fiscal rules. Section 3 specifies the econometric model and the estimation 
techniques. Section 4 presents the data followed by the estimation of the model and 
discussion of the empirical results. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion with the main 
findings of this paper. 
 
2. Literature on the EU fiscal rules 
In the literature there are several studies that try to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU 
fiscal rules. Some simply raise doubts about the rules themselves and the way they were 
defined by the European authorities in the SGP.2 Others like Gali and Perotti (2003), 
Marinheiro (2004) and Artis and Onorante (2006) analyse the impact of those rules on the 
conduct of fiscal policy by national governments and their impact on public investment and 
                                                 
1
 Hein and Truger (2005), Savona and Viviani (2003) and Soukiazis and Castro (2003, 2005) are the most 
relevant of the few papers that try to analyse this issue empirically. 
2
 See, for example, Thirlwall (2000) and Arestis et al. (2001). 
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on economic growth. Their results indicate that the improvement of budgetary balances in 
Europe was the result of a higher economic growth rather than active policy adjustments. 
However, the effect of those adjustments on growth itself is not examined in those studies.3 
Another current of thought emphasizes the need to boost economic performance as a 
condition for improving a country’s budgetary position in the long run and, consequently, 
economic growth should receive precedence over a strict application of the fiscal rules. Here, 
two studies must be highlighted: Von Hagen (2003) and Fatás, et al. (2003). The first argues 
that countries should be encouraged to adopt more growth-friendly policies by restructuring 
their government tax and expenditure systems; the second shows that expenditure-driven 
fiscal consolidations are more favourable to growth than revenue-driven consolidations. 
Despite these approaches, few empirical studies have intended to demonstrate how 
economic behaviour in Europe has been affected by Maastricht and SGP rules. One seminal 
empirical analysis is provided by Hein and Truger (2005). They examine the effects of EMU 
monetary and fiscal policies on growth and on convergence across the Euro-area and observe 
that, despite a significant nominal convergence, there was no real convergence in the Euro-
area. They also show that EMU macroeconomic policy institutions (ECB policy stance and 
SGP rules) have restrictive effects on growth. However, their conclusion that EMU 
macroeconomic policy institutions have restrictive effects on growth seems too strong: they 
analyse the whole period 1981-2001 without distinguishing the periods before and after the 
institutional cooperation has become stronger and they use an ad hoc specification without 
taking into account the economic growth literature. Hence, their growth equation can be 
criticised for not including important variables. 
                                                 
3
 Balassone and Franco (2000), Gali and Perotti (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), Verde (2004), Perée and 
Välilä (2005) and Välilä and Mehrotra (2005) also study the relation between EU fiscal policy rules and public 
investment. Unfortunately, these studies do not proceed to test the subsequent effect of public investment on EU 
economic growth. 
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A more consistent analysis can be found in Savona and Viviani (2003) and Soukiazis 
and Castro (2005). Their approaches are closer to growth theory. Even in these cases, though, 
a more adequate specification could be used: physical and human capital and short-term 
dynamics could be included in the model, since both studies use annual data. Savona and 
Viviani (2003) find evidence of a negative effect of current public spending on output growth 
and a positive impact of public capital spending on growth. In the light of these results, they 
argue for the modification of the rules of the Pact. In particular, they state that the rules 
should exempt public investment from constraints, but that the automatic checks on current 
public spending should be maintained. However, like Hein and Truger (2005), Savona and 
Viviani (2003) do not analyse the pre-and post-Maastricht (or SGP) periods separately nor the 
direct impact of Maastricht criteria and SGP rules on growth. Soukiazis and Castro (2003, 
2005) make that direct analysis and observe that the greater fiscal discipline after Maastricht 
was harmful to both growth of real output and convergence in per capita income in the EU. 
However, the evidence behind this conclusion is not strong enough because, although they 
find a lower rate of convergence in per capita output after Maastricht, their dummy for the 
period after Maastricht is not statistically significant. Moreover, they do not separately 
estimate the effects of the components of the deficit (current spending, public investment, tax 
revenues) on growth and they do not include human capital in their regressions. The inclusion 
of those variables would make their analysis more in line with growth theory. 
Departing from the existing literature, this study intends to overcome their flaws and 
provide a clear empirical answer to the question of whether the Maastricht and SGP fiscal 
rules have affected economic growth in Europe. It also tries to contribute to the literature with 
some improvements relative to the previous empirical works on the impact of EU institutional 
changes on growth. First, in this study the econometric analysis is built around a proper 
growth specification, unlike existing approaches that rely on ad-hoc (growth) equations. 
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Second, short-run dynamics of output are controlled for by using both short-run 
regressors in the growth equations for annual data and a five-year time spans analysis. As 
annual variations in output contain cyclical components, it is necessary to consider a 
specification that takes into account those short-run dynamics when we are using annual data. 
Third, a recently developed estimator is implemented in this analysis: a pooled mean 
group estimator. As this estimator allows for heterogeneity not only in the intercepts but also 
in other coefficients, it provides more flexibility than a fixed effects estimator to estimate the 
growth equation. 
Fourth, a time dummy for the period in which fiscal rules started to be officially 
assessed is now used, instead of only a dummy for the period after Maastricht. This dummy is 
useful to cover the period of effective enforcement of the fiscal rules. Additionally, an 
indicator to control for the constraints that result from the implementation of the fiscal rules is 
developed: the margin of manoeuvre indicator. This indicator tries to capture the impact of 
the restrictions over fiscal policy on growth. Finally, this study goes even further in the 
analysis and provides a comparison between the economic performances of the EU countries 
and a group of industrial non-EU countries. 
 
3. Specification of the growth equation and econometric techniques 
According to the works of Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995) and Bassanini and 
Scarpetta (2001), the following policy-augmented growth equation can be derived from a 
constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function:4 
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 The standard constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function is defined as: 
Y(t)=K(t)αH(t)β[A(t)L(t)]1-α-β, where the level of output at time t, (Y(t)), is a function of physical capital, (K(t)), 
human capital, (H(t)), labour, (L(t)) and the level of technological and economic efficiency, (A(t)). The partial 
elasticity of output with respect to physical and human capital are represented by α and β, respectively. See 
Castro (2007) for a detailed derivation of the policy-augmented equation from this production function. 
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where, y(t) is the level of output per capita in the period t, sk(t) is the investment rate in 
physical, h(t) is the stock of human capital, n(t) is the growth rate of labour, g is the constant 
growth rate of technological progress, d is the constant depreciation rate of both types of 
capital and Xj(t) is a vector of variables affecting economic efficiency. Short-term dynamics 
are controlled for to capture the short-run components of the dependent variable.5 
In this model the observed growth of GDP per capita is the result of the technological 
progress, the convergence process to each individual-specific steady-state and the shifts in the 
steady-state that may arise from changes in policy, institutions, investment rates and changes 
in population growth rate (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). 
Annual data are used to estimate the growth equation – in line with Cellini (1997) and 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) – instead of averages over time (twenty or five-year time 
spans) as in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). Data with annual frequency are preferred 
because large time spans can involve the loss of important information. Moreover, according 
to Cellini (1997), the use of annual data produces more plausible values for the elasticity of 
output to the exogenous variables than the estimates from lower frequency regressions. As 
annual variations in output contain cyclical components, it is necessary to consider a 
specification that takes into account those short-run dynamics. A way of controlling for those 
business cycle fluctuations is by including first-differences of the determinants of growth as 
                                                 
5
 The speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ) and the time to cover half way to convergence (hwtc) can be 
derived from the convergence parameter (ф) as follows: λ=-ln(1-ф) and hwtc=ln(0.5)/ln(1-ф). 
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short-run regressors in the equations.6 As a result, the general form of the growth equation can 
be written as an error correction model: 
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where ε symbolizes the error term and θs represents the long-run coefficients. As usual in 
growth literature, a value of 0.05 is assigned to the constant g+d.7 
The model will be estimated by using pooled cross-country time-series data for 15 EU 
countries, controlling for country-specific effects. In some regressions 8 additional industrial 
(OECD) countries will be included for comparative purposes. Equation (1) will be the basis 
for these estimations and then long-run coefficients will be obtained as φθ /ss a= . 
Fixed effects are preferred to random effects because the population of the 15 EU 
countries is entirely represented in the sample for the period under analysis.8 Moreover, the 
use of fixed effects will allow us to control for and capture the actual specific characteristics 
of each country in the sample. However, this may not be the best method to employ in this 
analysis. The fixed effects estimator allows intercepts to differ across countries while the 
other coefficients are constrained to be the same. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that the 
speed of convergence to the steady-state should be the same across countries (Bassanini and 
Scarpeta (2001)). Although there are reasons to believe in common long-run coefficients 
across EU countries – given they have access to common technologies and have intense trade 
                                                 
6
 Another way of controlling for those annual fluctuations on output is by using larger time spans. Despite the 
already mentioned loss of important information, a specification for a larger time span (five-years) will be 
considered later in this work with the aim of comparing results. 
7
 See, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992) and Cellini (1997). 
8
 For details, see Marinheiro (2004). Hausman tests (not reported here) also supported the fixed effects estimator. 
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relations – short-run dynamics and the speed of convergence may not be the same across 
countries. In order to control for that case, a pooled mean group (PMG) estimator is employed 
in a second phase of this study. This estimator, developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), 
allows the intercepts, speed of convergence, short run coefficients and error variances to differ 
across groups but imposes homogeneity on long long-run coefficients. Thus, with the PMG 
procedure, we are able to estimate directly the following error correction version of the 
growth equation:9 
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and the long-run homogeneity hypothesis permits the direct identification of the parameters 
that affect the steady-state path of output per capita ( iiss a φθ /,= ). 
This method requires T large enough such that we can estimate the model for each 
group separately. Therefore, when the data allows, this method will be used and its results 
compared to the results obtained with the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator. 
 
4. Empirical work 
This section starts by describing the data and variables used in the estimation of the 
growth equation. Then, the empirical results obtained from both the dynamic fixed effects 
estimator and the pooled mean group estimator will be presented and analysed. In the final 
part of this section those results will be compared with the results from the estimation of a 
growth equation using data for five-year time intervals instead of annual intervals. 
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 Note that both this equation and equation (2) rely on the assumption that regressors are cointegrated. 
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4.1. Data and description of the variables 
Annual data used to estimate the growth equation were mainly collected from the 
OECD Statistical Compendium (2006) for 15 EU countries and 8 non-EU countries over the 
period 1970-2005.10 A description of the variables used in this study and respective sources 
can be found in Table 1. The dependent variable is simply defined as the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita (∆lnY). 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Traditional economic growth literature considers that the rate of accumulation of 
physical capital, the accumulation of human capital and population growth are the most 
important factors in determining the level of real output per capita.11 Indeed, significant 
differences in the investment rate over time and across countries are seen as a source of cross-
country differences in output per capita. Studies on growth also assume that labour force 
skills and experience can represent a form of capital: human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). 
The variables used to collect the effects of the physical and human capital are the ratio of real 
private fixed capital formation to real GDP (lnPrivI) and the average number of years of 
schooling of the working-age population (lnHK), respectively. Population growth (lnPop) is 
another important variable to be considered in the growth equation. 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) argue that some macroeconomic issues must also be 
considered in a growth analysis, namely the impact of fiscal policy, the benefits of having low 
and stable inflation and the benefits of exploiting comparative advantages of trade. According 
to their analysis, fiscal policy can affect output and growth in the medium-term and over the 
business cycle. Those effects may come from the composition of public expenditure and from 
the sources of financing. More than the overall deficit, it is the composition of public 
                                                 
10
 The 15 EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK; The 8 non-EU countries are: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA. 
11
 See, for example, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). 
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spending that is relevant for economic growth. Furthermore, negative effects on growth arise 
when government relies more on direct (or distortionary) taxes and when its expenditure 
focuses on unproductive activities. Hence, the impact of fiscal policy should be evaluated by 
looking at the components of both government revenue (direct and indirect taxes) and 
expenditure (consumption and public investment). 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) also maintain that low and stable inflation can have a 
positive effect on the level of capital accumulation and consequently on growth because 
investment decisions are usually made with a long-run perspective. In addition, higher 
volatility in inflation brings uncertainty which discourages firms from investing in some 
interesting projects. Finally, they argue that the potential gains from trade and exposure to 
external competition are additional issues that must be controlled for. 
Besides the traditional determinants of economic growth described above, some 
qualitative variables are included in the equation to control for the period in which fiscal rules 
were imposed in Europe. Particular attention will be given to the results from those variables 
because they will allow us to see whether EU fiscal rules have affected growth in Europe and, 
if so, whether that impact has been positive or negative. 
A dummy variable, similar to the one used by Soukiazis and Castro (2005), was built 
to control for the period after Maastricht in the EU. This dummy is named D92eu and is equal 
to 1 when we are observing an EU country for the period 1992-2005, and 0 over the period 
1970-1991. It will take value 0 over the entire period 1970-2005 for the other OECD 
countries. An alternative dummy is built and used for the period in which the fulfilment of the 
3% criteria for the deficit is to be officially assessed. This period started in 1997 with the 
assessment of the countries that would take part in EMU.12 This second dummy is called 
                                                 
12
 Before 1997 countries had just to make efforts to converge; there was no particular sanction if convergence 
criteria were not accomplished in a particular year between 1992 and 1996. In 1997, the sanction is not to take 
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D97eu and assumes value 1 for EU countries in the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise. In 
practice, D97eu can be seen as a dummy that will account for the impact of the SGP rules 
after they really came into effect. 
Additionally, eight non-EU countries will be included in the sample. Both the EU and 
the non-EU countries are industrialised countries with similar characteristics, deep economic 
relations, access to common technologies and linked economic cycles, which means that they 
are more or less similarly affected by economic shocks. Therefore, the dummies (that take 
always value 0 for the non-EU countries) will, in this case, capture and reflect with more 
accuracy the particular effect of the EU fiscal rules on growth. Assuming that other factors 
will affect both groups in a similar way, the main differences will come from the specificities 
of the institutional changes in the EU. Considering that the fiscal rules established by the 
Maastricht Treaty and SGP are a very important specific characteristic of the EU economy 
during the period 1992-2005, then the coefficients on both dummies will allow us to conclude 
whether those rules have had a particular impact on the EU economic growth. 
Finally, to control more directly for the effects of the main constraint imposed over the 
public deficit after 1992 – i.e. the limit of 3% of GDP for the deficit – we develop what we 
call an indicator for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy (MgM). This indicator measures 
the (normalised) distance of the actual level of the government budget surplus to the 3% fiscal 
rule for the deficit imposed after Maastricht. The 3% deficit rule is the basis to define this 
indicator. The deficit ruls is the rule to which the European authorities have given more 
importance. As this rule started to be imposed only after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, we 
assume that before 1992 there were no (formal) fiscal constraints over the fiscal policy of the 
EU members. Therefore, countries had complete margin of manoeuvre over their fiscal 
policy. This means that the index we developed (MgM) should be equal to one in that period, 
                                                                                                                                                        
part in EMU if the criteria are not accomplished. After that, with the SGP, fines can be imposed if a country does 
not accomplish the 3% rule for the deficit. See Castro (2007), for further details on the criteria and fines. 
 13 
indicating full margin of manoeuvre. In the period after Maastricht, we may have a range 
between full and no (zero) margin of manoeuvre ( 10 ≤≤ MgM ). If there is a surplus in the 
period after Maastricht we also consider that the country has full margin of manoeuvre over 
its fiscal policy. 
To identify the margin of manoeuvre after Maastricht when a country has a deficit, we 
compute the distance between the actual budget deficit and the 3%-limit imposed by 
Maastricht and the SGP and divide it by 3 to normalize the indicator. This means that as the 
deficit increases the margin of manoeuvre is reduced. In the limit, it will be 0 when the deficit 
is 3% of the GDP or above, which means that the country will be forced by the European 
Commission to take action to correct it. Consequently, in such situation a country is not 
formally allowed to use fiscal policy to stimulate output.13 
Therefore, the margin of manoeuvre indicator was included in the model to capture the 
impact of the restrictions over fiscal policy on growth. The expectation is that the greater is 
the margin of manoeuvre this period, the stronger will be economic growth in the next period, 
because countries with a good fiscal margin of manoeuvre can always boost the economy in 
“bad times”. As Maastricht and SGP rules reduce the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy in 
most EU countries, this means that if the coefficient on this variable is significantly positive 
then it can be concluded that the impact of those rules on EU economic growth was negative. 
In practice, the growth equations to be empirically estimated are equal to equations (2) 
or (3) – depending on which estimator is used – plus the term tid ,γ , where tid ,  represents one 
of those qualitative variables that control for the period in which EU fiscal rules were 
imposed in the EU: D92eu, D97eu or MgM. 
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 See Table 1 for more details on how this indicator is built. 
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4.2. Regressions and interpretation of the main results 
Based on the theoretical approach and variables discussed above, this paper proceeds 
with the empirical analysis to determine whether fiscal rules imposed in Europe in the period 
after Maastricht have had a significant effect on growth in the EU countries. First, we will 
present and analyse the results from the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator and then the 
results from a pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. 
Before proceeding to the estimation of the error correction models, using either the 
DFE estimator or the PMG estimator, it is convenient to analyse whether the regressors are 
I(0) or I(1), i.e. whether they are stationary or not. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) show that 
the same algorithm can be used to compute the PMG estimators whether regressors are I(0) or 
I(1), but their asymptotic distributions are slightly different. If the regressors are not 
stationary but are I(1), then it is necessary that they are cointegrated (this means that the error 
term of the long-run equation is a stationary process for all countries); otherwise, we cannot 
guarantee that the estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient. Thus, to make the 
cointegration analysis, we start by testing the order of integration of the regressors and then – 
if they are I(1) – cointegration tests are performed. 
Panel unit root tests for each variable are presented in Table 2. Statistics were obtained 
by applying the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test. This test assumes that all series are 
non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Results provide evidence that most of the regressors 
can be considered non-stationary (or I(1)) at a significance level of 5%: only SDInfl and 
lnPop seem to be clearly stationary; the other regressors are either non-stationary or 
borderline, so we proceed treating them as non-stationary. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Having concluded that series are essentially integrated of order 1, some cointegration 
tests were performed by using Pedroni (1999) tests. Pedroni’s panel tests for cointegration are 
also reported in Table 2. Results show that 4 of the 7 tests reject the null hypothesis of no-
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cointegration (panel υ, pp, ADF and group pp tests). Although not all tests reject the null 
hypothesis, the majority do. This fact provides some evidence of cointegration among the 
variables, which permits us to proceed with the estimation of the growth model presented 
above using either a DFE estimator or a PMG estimator in the context of an error correction 
mechanism. 
The results from a dynamic panel data estimation controlling for fixed effects are 
presented in Table 3. The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation is 
controlled for by using robust standard errors. Economic policy variables are lagged one 
period in all estimations in order to better identify their long-run impact on output and to 
account for the usual delays in reporting of economic data. The time trend was not included in 
these regressions because, when included, it was never statistically significant. Columns 1, 2 
and 3 present results just for EU countries. In the remaining estimations the non-EU countries 
are included with the intention of doing a comparative analysis. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Results for the traditional determinants of economic growth are as expected. The 
convergence coefficient is statistically significant in all regressions presented in Table 3. 
Estimations show that convergence in output per capita in the EU countries runs at an annual 
rate of about 3.5%, which means that each year an economy’s GDP covers about 3.5% of its 
distance from the steady state.14 This suggests that it takes about 19 years to reduce by half 
the differences in output per capita among EU countries. The coefficients on physical and 
human capital and population growth have the expected signs and are highly significant in 
almost all specifications. Thus, an increase in private investment and years of schooling and a 
decrease in population growth have a positive impact on output per capita in the long-run. 
                                                 
14Although rather low, this is a value that is in accordance with some seminal contributions to the empirical 
growth literature: see Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), among others. 
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However, only private investment has significant effects in the short-run.15 This result can be 
interpreted as a consequence of the fact that it usually takes more time to increase human 
capital and population than to increase physical capital. Therefore, the effects of an increase 
in human capital or in the population are only really evident after a reasonable period of time, 
i.e. they are only felt in the long-run.16 
As expected, government investment (lnGovI) has a positive and significant impact on 
real output per capita while government final consumption expenditure (lnGovC) affects it 
negatively both in the long-run and in the short-run. These results support the view of EU 
authorities that cuts in current expenditures to control the deficit may have positive effects on 
output in the long-run, but they also enhance the relevance given by some authors to public 
investment (Savona and Viviani (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Verde (2004)). In 
fact, EU authorities should take into account not only the importance of controlling excessive 
deficits but also the benefits of ‘productive’ public investment in the definition and 
application of the fiscal rules to countries in the EMU. 
It was also expected that a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing consumption 
would have positive growth effects, but this study does not identify those positive effects in 
the long-run. The long-run coefficient on the variable lnGovTx is not statistically significant 
in any of the regressions. In the short-run they seem to have an effect contrary to the one 
expected, but it is not always statistically significant. 
The variability of inflation (SdInfl) has a negative impact on output per capita only in 
the long-run, which is in accord with the findings of Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). Inflation 
itself was also used as an alternative, but results were quite similar.17 As inflation shows a 
high correlation with the convergence variable and human capital, the variability of inflation 
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 See results on the short-run dynamics. 
16
 In fact, investment in education is always a long-run investment. 
17
 Results are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
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is used instead.18 The results also suggest significant gains from trade and exposure to 
external competition in the long-run. The sign of the coefficient on lnX/M indicates that the 
higher the proportion of exports over imports the higher the output per capita. 
However, the results of most interest in this analysis come from the dummy variables 
for the post-Maastricht period. In the first regression presented in Table 3, the dummy D92eu 
was used to control for the growth effects in the EU-15 in the period after Maastricht. The 
coefficient on this variable is not significant. A similar result was obtained by Soukiazis and 
Castro (2005) in their convergence analysis. This result may indicate that the institutional 
changes that took place in Europe after Maastricht were not harmful to output growth. Indeed, 
when we consider a dummy just for the period in which the fiscal rules started to be assessed 
(D97eu) it is even possible to conclude that growth of real GDP per capita is significantly 
higher than before: results show that after 1997 growth of real GDP per capita is, on average, 
about 0.5 percentage points higher than before. Therefore, these results give us some scope to 
conclude that economic growth in the EU was not negatively affected by those rules, contrary 
to what some authors argue.19 
The third regression includes the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre lagged one 
period but results show an insignificant coefficient. Hence, our expectation that the reduction 
of the margin of manoeuvre could affect output is not verified. One interesting conclusion can 
be retrieved from this result: the reduction of the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy in the 
period after Maastricht did not have a negative impact on growth, meaning once again that 
fiscal rules were not as harmful to growth of real GDP per capita as one might imagine. The 
lack of significance for the coefficient associated to MgM is, therefore, supporting the results 
obtained with D92eu. 
                                                 
18
 Theoretically, it makes more sense to use the variability of inflation than its level, because the variability of 
inflation affects much more the decisions of consumption and investment (and the economic growth) in the 
medium and long-term than its level. 
19
 For example, Thirlwall (2000), Arestis et al. (2001), Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006), among others. 
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Next, other OECD developed countries were included in the sample for the period 
1972-2004. Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results for the whole period. The dummy D97eu 
remains significant. In this case, that means that growth of GDP per capita in EU was not only 
higher than before 1997 but, at the same time, higher than in the other non-EU countries. To 
separate the temporal effect from the cross-country effects, estimations were performed just 
for the period after Maastricht. In column 5, the results for the period after 1992 are reported. 
In this case, the dummy D92eu is directly comparing the difference in growth between EU 
and non-EU countries. Results for the dummy do not show a significant difference in growth 
of GDP per capita: the estimated coefficient on the dummy is positive but insignificant. 
However, when we consider just the period after 1997, and D97eu is included instead, it is 
possible to observe a significantly higher growth in the group of the EU countries than in the 
other countries. In this case, a random effects estimator was used because the dummy D97eu 
was dropped in the fixed effects estimation due to lack of variability. In order to overcome 
that problem, an estimation for the period 1992-2004 was performed (column 7) using the 
dummy D97eu. The significance of the coefficients improves and the dummy remains highly 
significant. In fact, this is giving more support to the idea that growth in the EU countries in 
the period after 1997 was not negatively affected by the fiscal rules. Indeed, if we gather the 
results of columns 6 and 7, there is evidence that growth was not lower in the EU than in the 
other non-EU countries. 
Results of the PMG estimations and some robustness analyses are presented in Table 
4. Only long-run and dummy coefficients are reported, in order to save space and given their 
relevance for this study. Columns 1 to 3 show the results of the PMG estimations for the EU 
countries over the period 1972-2004.20 The results of some robustness checks are shown in 
the remaining part of the table. 
                                                 
20
 The author wishes to thank Ed Blackburne for providing the STATA code to perform the PMG estimations. 
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In the fixed effects estimations it was considered that intercepts could differ across 
groups but the other coefficients were constrained to be the same. Although the fact that the 
EU countries have access to common technologies and deep economic relations may justify 
the presence of common long-run coefficients, the speed of convergence to the steady-state 
and the short-run dynamics may not be the same across countries. Indeed, each country can 
follow a different path to the steady-state. Hence, the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999) seems to be a suitable instrument to control for these specificities. 
This method improves the significance of most estimates and generates a higher 
convergence coefficient. These results are a consequence of the improvements made on the 
assumptions of the model and are in line with the examples presented by Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (1999). Now results suggest that it takes about 10 years to reduce by half the 
differences in output per capita among EU countries. This result seems to be more adequate 
for industrial countries that have been increasing their efforts of integration over the last 
decades. Estimated coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth have 
the expected signs and remain highly significant. Evidence on fiscal variables is also 
consistent with the previous findings: there is evidence favouring both the positive impact of 
public investment and the negative effect of public consumption on GDP per capita; and, once 
again, the positive effect of shifting taxes from factor incomes to consumption is not evident 
in the data. Finally, results confirm the negative impact of inflation on output and the 
expected gains from trade. 
The most relevant findings are provided by the time dummies and by the margin of 
manoeuvre indicator. The coefficient on the dummy for the period after Maastricht (D92eu) 
remains insignificant. Considering the dummy for the period in which the fiscal rules started 
to be officially assessed (D97eu), we get evidence that supports the previous finding that real 
growth of GDP per capita was slightly higher during that period than before. In this case, 
results show that after 1997 growth of real GDP per capita is, on average, about 0.9 
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percentage points higher than before. Finally, when the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre 
is included instead of the dummies, results confirm the insignificance of its coefficient, which, 
once again, supports de results given by D92eu. Thus, these results indicate that the 
restrictions over the deficit did not affect countries’ capacity to use fiscal policy over the 
economic cycle. Therefore, the results from the PMG estimations reinforce our conclusion 
that economic growth was not negatively affected by the EU fiscal rules. 
It is not possible to use the PMG estimator to compare EU and non-EU countries due 
to the lack of variability of the dummy variables when the model is estimated for each country 
separately before retrieving the PMG estimates. Moreover, PMG estimator requires a T large 
enough such that we can estimate the model for each country individually. This means that it 
is not viable to proceed with a comparative analysis of our model for the periods before and 
after Maastricht either.21 Therefore, this study proceeds with the robustness analysis by using 
a fixed effects estimator. Results are presented in columns 4 to 7 of Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Column 4 presents results of an identical specification to columns 6 of Table 3, but 
using a different estimation method, which is more suited to cases like this, where the number 
of time periods is substantially smaller than the number of individuals (T small, N large). This 
specification is based on the application of Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator.22 
This method improves the statistical significance of the coefficients and the results are, once 
again, indicating that after 1997 growth of GDP per capita in the EU countries is, on average, 
                                                 
21
 Due to the very low number of degrees of freedom it is not possible to get estimates for the convergence 
coefficient for some countries in the sample. 
22
 In the regression of column 4, the log of real GDP per capita is instrumented with its second and following 
lags and the other variables are instrumented with their own values. 
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higher than growth in other industrial OECD countries; when the threshold is 1992, no 
significant differences are found.23 
In columns 5 and 6, we compare the economic performance of the EU countries before 
and after 1997; the same is done for the periods before and after 1992, but only the 
convergence coefficient is reported. Instead of using dummies, a separate regression for each 
period is estimated. The focus of this analysis will be in comparing the convergence 
coefficient of each regression. The convergence coefficient for the period before 1997 is 
considerably lower (in absolute value) than the one for the period after 1997, meaning that the 
speed of convergence to the steady-state is higher in the period in which fiscal rules are 
officially enforced than before. This evidence confirms the result given by d97eu above. 
When we compare pre-and post-Maastricht periods separately no substantial differences are 
found, confirming once again the results obtained before for the case where d92eu was used. 
The last column reports estimates to compare the performance of the non-EU countries 
with the performance of the EU countries in the period after 1997 (and 1992). Despite the 
problems of significance due to the low number of observations in the regression for non-EU 
countries, results show that the speed of convergence in the EU countries is not substantially 
different from the other OECD countries, whichever period is considered. This is further 
evidence to reinforce the idea that EU fiscal rules may have not indeed affected economic 
growth in Europe. 
Thus, from this simple analysis it is possible to conclude that output growth was not 
negatively affected in the period after Maastricht in the EU. Therefore, Maastricht and SGP 
fiscal rules for the deficit and debt should not be blamed for being harmful to growth of real 
GDP per capita in the EU countries. On the contrary, evidence shows that, on average, growth 
is statistically higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit 
                                                 
23
 In this case only the results for the convergence coefficient and the dummy are reported; the estimated 
coefficients for the other variables are available upon request. 
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started to be officially assessed – either comparing it with the past performance of the EU 
countries or even with the performance of other developed countries. 
Other estimations were performed including the level of inflation instead of its 
volatility, the deficit instead of the fiscal variables, the public debt and the average growth in 
the OECD countries, and even variables controlling for the iteration of the exogenous 
variables with the dummies, but the main results remain unchanged. The results on the fiscal 
variables do not change even when all economic policy variables are excluded from the 
model. Some attempts were made to improve the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre, but it 
remained insignificant. The results and conclusions of this work are also robust to the 
exclusion of one EU country at a time from the sample, to the exclusion of the 3 EU countries 
that did not take part in the EMU (Denmark, Sweden and UK) and remain valid even when 
only the group of countries that have had problems in accomplishing the 3% rule for the 
deficit is considered in the sample (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK). A final 
analysis assessed whether growth was higher in the non-EU countries after 1997, like it was 
in the EU countries. Results shown that, on average, growth was not significantly higher in 
the other OECD countries after 1997.24 This result gives more support to the idea advanced in 
this study that EU economic growth was not negatively affected by the fiscal rules. 
 
4.3. Estimations using five-year time intervals 
In the empirical analysis so far, annual data have been used to estimate the growth 
equation. Yearly time spans are used to avoid the loss of important information that might 
result from the use of larger time spans. The justification for the choice of annual data 
becomes more evident when economic performance of the EU and on-EU countries is 
compared and when a separate comparative analysis for the periods before and after 
                                                 
24
 Those estimation results are not reported here, but they are available in Castro (2007). 
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Maastricht (or SGP) is made. This choice implied the inclusion of short-run dynamics in the 
equation to control for cyclical fluctuations of output. 
Another way of avoiding the problem of the short-run business cycle fluctuations of 
output is precisely by using data from larger time intervals. Despite the mentioned loss of 
information that may result from the use of these larger time spans, we will proceed with the 
estimation of some growth equations using data from five-year time intervals in line with the 
works by Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Bond et al. (2001) and Ederveen et al. (2006). 
The objective of this analysis is to evaluate the robustness of the results to a change in the 
time spans. 
As a result of the use of five-year time intervals, the general form of the growth 
equation can simply be written as: 
tititititititiiti dxnhskyy ,,,,3,2,11,,0, ')05.0ln(lnlnlnln εγδβββφα ++++++++=∆ −  (4) 
for Ni ,...,1=  and Tt ,...,2= , where tiy ,ln∆  is the log difference in output per capita over a 
five-year period, 1,ln −tiy  is the logarithm of output per capita at the start of that period and 
tix ,  is a vector of additional variables to be included in the basic growth equation. These 
variables and the other explanatory variables (lnsk, lnh, ln(n+0.05)) are measured as the 
average over each five-year period. A dummy or qualitative variable ( tid , ) is added to the 
equation to control for the period in which EU fiscal rules were imposed in the EU. 
Considering the same data and time period used in the annual analysis (1970-2005), 
seven five-year time spans are constructed for the 15 EU countries. These data is then used in 
the estimation of equation (4). Different estimators have been used in the literature to estimate 
this kind of dynamic panel data models. In this analysis we will basically employ fixed effects 
(FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The results of the estimation of 
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the growth equation considering five-year time spans are reported in Table 5. The regressions 
consider the same variables used in the annual analysis.25 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
The estimates presented in column 1 and 2 were obtained by using a FE estimator. The 
convergence coefficient has the correct sign and is statistically significant in all of the 
estimations, showing that convergence in output per capita runs at an annual rate of about 8%. 
The coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth have the expected 
signs and are significant. The additional variables do not present robust results: only the 
government consumption (lnGovC) and the log of the ratio of exports over imports (lnX/M) 
have the expected signs and are significant; a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing 
consumption has a negative effect on output, contrary to expectations; and the other variables 
are not significant. Moreover, neither of the dummies nor the margin of manoeuvre are 
significant, which can be interpreted as an additional empirical support to the idea advanced 
in this study that institutional changes that took place in Europe after Maastricht were not 
harmful to growth. 
As the fixed effects estimator may lead to inconsistent estimates in the context of 
empirical growth models, results from GMM estimators are reported in columns 3, 4 and 5. 
The instruments used for the first-differenced GMM estimator (DIF-GMM) are the second 
and third lags of the log of output per capita. All other right-hand-side variables are assumed 
exogenous and are instrumented with just their own values in order to avoid the problem of 
too many instruments. The additional instrument used in the system GMM estimator (SYS-
GMM) is the difference of the log of output per capita lagged one period. Moreover, the 
                                                 
25
 Note, however, that as we are considering five-year time intervals, it is not possible to use rigorously the same 
time periods for the dummies. The best we can do is to use a dummy that takes value 1 from the time interval 
1991-1995 onwards (D91eu) and a dummy that takes value 1 in the intervals starting in 1996 and 2001 (D96eu). 
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Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions does not rejects the overall validity of those 
instruments. 
Results for the DIF-GMM estimator show a higher rate of convergence of output to its 
steady-state, but the physical capital variable is no longer significant and the coefficient on 
government investment has a sign contrary to the expected. As the sample contains a small 
number of time periods, these results can be the consequence of the finite sample bias of this 
estimator. To avoid that problem, we also report results from a system GMM estimator (SYS-
GMM), which tends to produce more reliable results in this kind of studies. 
The SYS-GMM estimator reports a lower estimate for the speed of convergence than 
the DIF-GMM, but not very far from the one obtained by using a FE estimator.26 In general, 
the coefficients are not very different from the ones obtained by fixed effects. The main 
difference comes from the dummy for the period in which fiscal rules are officially assessed. 
In this case, we find evidence of a higher growth rate in that period than before. Results show 
that in the period after 1996 annual growth of real GDP per capita is, on average, about 0.86 
percentage points higher than in the period before. In addition, no significant differences in 
growth are found in the pre- and post-Maastricht periods.27 
As the coefficients associated with the additional explanatory variables are not 
significant, a simple basic growth model was considered in the regression presented in 
column 5. However, despite the evidence of a slightly slower speed of convergence, the main 
conclusions of this paper are not affected. As a final robustness check of the results obtained 
so far, column 6 reports the results obtained by a simple two-stages least squares estimator (2-
SLS), where the log of the initial output per capita is instrumented with its second lag. As the 
                                                 
26
 The SYS-GMM estimates indicate a speed of convergence of about 9%. These estimates are very similar to 
the ones obtained with the PMG estimator for yearly-time spans. They are even close to the GMM estimates 
obtained by Caselli et al. (1996) and Ederveen et al. (2006). 
27
 The margin of manoeuvre was also included in the GMM estimations (results are not reported here). However, 
as in the case of the FE estimations, its coefficient was never statistically significant. 
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sample size is not large, reasonable results are expected from this estimator. Indeed, the main 
findings are not substantially different from the ones obtained with the other estimators. 
In sum, the results obtained using five-year time spans corroborate the main 
conclusion of the yearly-time spans analysis: growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not 
negatively affected in the period after Maastricht, i.e. in the period in which fiscal rules were 
imposed over the EU countries. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper intends to find an empirical answer to the question of whether the SGP 
fiscal rules have affected EU growth negatively. We start by showing that there is no 
consensus in the literature regarding this issue: some authors claim that the SGP fiscal rules 
can be prejudicial for growth in the EU; others argue that those rules are necessary to promote 
fiscal consolidation and economic stability in the EMU, which, in turn, will be beneficial for 
growth in the long-run. However, very little empirical work has been done to clarify this 
debate. The aim of this study is to contribute to this debate with solid empirical evidence. It 
also tries to introduce some improvements relative to previous empirical works in order to 
overcome their limitations. In particular, a proper growth equation and a different method of 
estimation (pooled mean group estimation) are employed. A dummy variable for the period in 
which fiscal rules started to be officially assessed is used and a new indicator – called margin 
of manoeuvre indicator – is developed and included in the model to be tested. Finally, we 
provide a cross-comparison between EU and non-EU countries. 
Considering those improvements and using a specific growth equation for both yearly 
and five-year time spans, this paper shows that growth was not negatively affected in the 
period after Maastricht in the EU. This conclusion holds even when we compare recent 
performance of EU countries with their past performance or with the performance of other 
developed countries. Therefore, the evidence provided in this paper allows us to conclude that 
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Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules were not harmful to growth of real GDP per capita in the 
group of 15 EU countries analysed in this study. On the contrary, evidence shows that, on 
average, growth is statistically higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria 
for the deficit started to be officially assessed. This study also presents some evidence 
favouring the EU fiscal rules for the public deficit and debt. 
In sum, all the relevant evidence provided by this study is against the claims that the 
SGP fiscal rules can be prejudicial for growth in the EU and sustains the view that those rules 
are important to promote fiscal consolidation and the necessary economic stability, which are 
essential to guarantee a sustainable economic growth in the long-run. 
Evidence from the annual analysis also indicates that an increase in government 
investment has a positive and significant impact on real output per capita. Therefore, EU 
authorities should give some special attention to the potential benefits of productive public 
investment when assessing whether a deficit is excessive. Otherwise, some countries could 
find it easier to cut public investment than current expenditures in ‘bad’ times to accomplish 
the 3% deficit/GDP ratio. According to the findings of this study, such behaviour would be 
prejudicial for output growth. 
Additionally, our results also suggest that it takes roughly a decade to reduce by half 
the differences in output per capita among EU countries and that an increase in private 
investment and years of schooling and a decrease in population growth have a positive impact 
on output per capita. These results are all in line with the economic growth literature. 
An interesting extension to the analysis provided in this paper could be to make a 
similar analysis using the countries that have joined to the EU in this decade. The study of the 
impact of the fiscal constraints and institutional changes that they have to face to control their 
public accounts and to enhance the credibility of their institutions may possibly bring some 
additional insights to the understanding of the impact of those constraints on their economic 
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performance. One obstacle to that study could be the lack of data for the decades of 1970s and 
1980s for some of those countries. 
Finally, once more data becomes available, another possible extension to this study 
could be to analyse how the EU countries have been coping with the reformed SGP and what 
have been its implications for economic growth. In particular, it would be interesting to 
analyse whether the reformed SGP has continued to promote the necessary balanced budgets 
in periods of economic expansion and whether it has been more flexible in allowing the 
required margin of manoeuvre for the EU countries to stimulate growth in periods of 
economic slowdown or recession. In other words, it would be worthwhile to analyse whether 
the reformed SGP has been more growth promoting while it tries to keep EU governments’ 
accounts on the track of a balanced budget over the medium-term. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The author is in debt to Jennifer Smith for many fruitful discussions, comments, 
suggestions and revisions. The author also acknowledges Natalie Chen, Francisco Veiga, 
Elias Soukiazis, the participants at the INFER Workshop on ‘Integration and Globalization’ 
and the two referees of this paper for invaluable comments and suggestions. The author also 
wishes to express his gratitude for the financial support from the Portuguese Foundation for 
Science and Technology (FCT) under Scholarship SFRH/BD/21500/2005. 
 29 
Bibliographical references 
Arellano, M., Bond, S. (1991) ‘Some specification tests for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations’. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-298. 
Arestis, P., McCauley, K., Sawyer, M (2001) ‘An alternative stability pact for the European 
Union’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, 113-130. 
Artis, M., Onorante, L. (2006) ‘The economic importance of fiscal rules’. CEPR Discussion 
Paper 5684. 
Barro, R. (1991) ‘Economic growth in a cross-section of countries’. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, 407-443. 
Barro, R., Sala-i-Martin, X (1992) ‘Convergence’. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 223-
251. 
Balassone, F., Franco, D. (2000) ‘Public investment, the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
Golden Rule’. Fiscal Studies, 21, 207-299. 
Bassanini, A., Scarpetta, S. (2001) ‘The driving forces of economic growth: panel data 
evidence for the OECD countries’. OECD Economic Studies, 33(II), 9-56. 
Blanchard, O., Giavazzi, F. (2004) ‘Improving the SGP through a proper accounting of public 
investment’. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4220. 
Bond, S., Hoeffler, A., Temple, J. (2001) ‘GMM estimation of empirical growth models’. 
Mimeo, available at «http://staff.feweb.vu.nl/celbers/GMMgrowthreg.pdf». 
Caselli, F., Esquivel, G., Lefort, F. (1996) ‘Reopening the convergence debate: a new look at 
cross-country growth empirics’. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 363-389. 
Castro, V., 2007 ‘The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth’. The 
Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), Working Paper No. 794, 
available at «http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/». 
Cellini, R (1997) ‘Growth empirics: evidence from a panel of annual data’. Applied Economic 
Letters 4, 347-351. 
 30 
De la Fuente, A., Doménech, R. (2000) ‘Human capital in growth regressions: how much 
difference does data quality make?’ Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Mimeo, 
available at «http://ideas.repec.org/aub/autbar/446.00.html» 
Ederveen, S., Groot, H., Nahuis, R. (2006) ‘Fertile soil for structural funds? A panel data 
analysis of the conditional effectiveness of European cohesion policy’. Kyklos 59, 17-42. 
Fatás, A., von Hagen, J., Hughes-Hallett, A. Strauch, R., Sibert, A. (2003) ‘Stability and 
Growth in Europe: towards a better Pact’. CEPR, Monitoring European Integration 13. 
Gali, J., Perotti, R. (2003) ‘Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe’. NBER 
Working Paper No. 9773. 
Hein, E., Truger, A. (2005) ‘European Monetary Union: nominal convergence, real 
divergence and slow growth?’ Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 16, 7-33. 
Islam, N. (1995) ‘Growth empirics: a panel data approach’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110, 1127-1170. 
Mankiw, G., Romer, D., Weil, D. (1992) ‘A contribution to the empirics of economic 
growth’. Quarterly Journal of Eonomics 107, 407-437. 
Marinheiro, C. (2004) ‘Has the Stability and Growth Pact stabilized?’ Mimeo, available at 
«http://www4.fe.uc.pt/carlosm/research/pdf/sgpdec04_cmarinheiro.pdf». 
OECD (1998-2006), Education at a Glance, various issues. 
OECD (2006). Statistical Compendium, April 2006. 
Pedroni, P. (1999). ‘Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors’. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 653-670. 
Perée, E., Välilä, T. (2005) ‘Fiscal rules and public investment’. European Investment Bank 
Economic and Financial Report 2005/02. 
Pesaran, M., Shin, Y., Smith, R. (1999) ‘Pooled mean estimation of dynamic heterogeneous 
panels’. Journal of American Statistical Association 94, 621-634. 
 31 
Savona, P., Viviani, C. (2003) ‘The impact of the Stability and growth pact on real economic 
growth: automatic mechanism or policy discretion?’ Review of Economic Conditions in 
Italy 2, 263-279. 
Soukiazis, E., Castro, V. (2003) ‘The impact of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact on growth and unemployment in Europe’. CEUNEUROP, Discussion 
Paper No. 15, available at «http://www4.fe.uc.pt/ceue». 
Soukiazis, E., Castro, V. (2005) ‘How the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact affected real convergence in the European Union: a panel data analysis’. Journal of 
Policy Modeling 27, 385-399. 
Thirlwall, A., (2000) ‘The Euro and regional divergence in Europe’. Mimeo, available at 
«http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/staff/at4/curres.html». 
Välilä, T., Mehrotra, A. (2005) ‘Evolution and determinants of public investment in Europe’. 
European Investment Bank Economic and Financial Report 2005/01. 
Verde, A. (2004) ‘The Stability and Growth Pact in rainy days: an alternative view’. Bank of 
Valletta Review 30, 14-31. 
Von Hagen, J. (2003) ‘Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: experiences with the 
Stability and Growth Pact’. Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI) Working 
Paper B-06-2003. University of Bonn. 
Warin, T. (2005) ‘The hidden structural features of the fiscal rule: a European saga’. 
International Advances in Economic Research 11, 29-38. 
Wyplosz, C. (2006) ‘European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major success’. Economic 
Policy 21, 207-261. 
 32 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Description of the Variables 
Dependent variable: 
∆lnY – growth rate of real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years old at price levels and purchasing 
power parities (PPP) of 2000. 
Convergence variable: 
lnYt-1 – lagged real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years at price levels and PPP of 2000. 
Basic economic growth explanatory variables: 
lnPrivI – the logarithm of the ratio of the real private fixed capital formation to real GDP is used as a proxy for 
the propensity to accumulate physical capital. 
lnHK – the stock of human capital is proxied by the logarithm of the average number of years of schooling of the 
(working-age) population from 25 to 64 years of age. 
lnPop – represents the log of population (aged 15-64) growth (i.e. n) plus the constant g+d to which is assigned 
the value of 0.05 as in Mankiw et al. (1992). 
Exogenous economic policy variables: 
lnGovI – the log of the ratio of government (gross) fixed capital formation to GDP (both at market or current 
prices) is used as proxy for government investment. 
lnGovC – represents the log of government final consumption expenditure divided by GDP (both at market or 
current prices). 
lnGovTx – log of the ratio of direct to indirect government tax revenues (both at market or current prices). 
SdInfl – inflation volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the rate of growth in the consumer price 
index (CPI) computed as a centred three year moving average. 
lnX/M – the log of the ratio of exports to imports (both at 2000 prices) is a proxy for gains from trade. 
Qualitative variables to control for the period of EU fiscal rules: 
D92EU – dummy that takes value 1 for EU countries for the period 1992-2005 and 0 otherwise. 
D97EU – dummy that takes value 1 for EU countries for the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise. 
MgM – indicator for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy, which is defined according to the SGP rules: 
before Maastricht it is assumed that EU countries have total margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy => 
MgM.=1; after Maastricht the margin of manoeuvre is computed as follows: 
MgM = (GBS+3)/3                              if GDP growth>-0.75% and -3%<GBS<0% 
  = 1                                              if GDP growth < -2% or GBS > 0%; 
  = 0.5                                           if -2% < GDP growth < -0.75% and GBS < -3%; 
  = 0.5*1+0.5*(GBS+3)/3            if -2% < GDP <-0.75% and -3% < GBS <0%; 
  = 0                                              if growth GDP>-0.75% and GBS<-3%; 
GBS means government budget surplus and 0.5 is a plausible guess for the probability of the deficit not 
being considered ‘excessive’ by the European Commission in a situation of moderate recession. To 
simplify the analysis, this indicator is normalized to the interval [0;1]; 0 means no margin of manoeuvre 
and 1 means total margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy. 
Sources: OECD Statistical Compendium, April 2006 (for all variables except human capital). Data for human capital from 
1970 to 1990 was interpolated from five-year observations from De la Fuente and Domenéch (2000). For the period 
1996 to 2004 data were obtained from OECD Education at a Glance, various issues (1998 to 2006). Missing 
observations were filled by linear interpolation. 
Notes: The panel of countries for which data were collected is the following: 
EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK; 
non-EU countries: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA. 
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Table 2. Results from dynamic fixed effects panel data estimations 
Panel unit root tests Level 1st diff.   Pedroni panel cointegration tests 
lnY 
lnPrivI 
lnHK 
lnPop 
lnGovI 
lnGovC 
lnGovTx 
SDInfl 
lnX/M 
-1.43 
-1.93 
-0.38 
-2.34 
-1.39 
-1.80 
-1.71 
-3.32 
-1.92 
-3.57 
-4.39 
-3.58 
-4.88 
-4.15 
-4.05 
-4.29 
-5.56 
-4.22 
  Panel υ –statistic 
Panel rho-statistic 
Panel pp-statistic 
Panel ADF-statistic 
Group rho-statistic 
Group pp-statistic 
Group ADF-statistic 
 
 4.54 
 2.28 
-2.69 
-1.85 
 3.67 
-1.99 
-0.71 
Notes: In the panel unit root tests the critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.04, -1.90, and -1.81, respectively; 
for example, a k<-1.90 implies rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root or non-stationarity at 5%. Results 
and critical values for these tests were obtained by using the ‘ipshin’ command in STATA. 
Pedroni tests were performed by using a procedure written by Peter Pedroni for RATS; all reported values 
for Pedroni statistics are distributed N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration and those statistics 
are one-sided tests with a critical value of -1.64 for a level of significance of 5% (k<-1.64 implies rejection 
of the null), except the υ-statistic that has a critical value 1.64 (k>1.64 means rejection of the null 
hypothesis). 
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Table 3. Results from dynamic fixed effects panel data estimations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        lnYit-1 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.0346 
(-2.99)*** 
[0.035] 
19.7 years 
-0.0375 
(-3.33)*** 
[0.038] 
18.1 years 
-0.0350 
(-3.12)*** 
[0.036] 
19.4 years 
-0.0352 
(-4.53)*** 
[0.036] 
19.3 years 
-0.0590 
(-3.71)*** 
[0.061] 
11.4 years 
-0.0275 
(-2.06)** 
[0.028] 
24.9 years 
-0.0697 
(-4.39)*** 
[0.072] 
9.6 years 
        lnPrivIit 0.8103 
(2.57)** 
0.6537 
(2.40)** 
0.7960 
(2.60)*** 
0.5073 
(2.31)** 
0.8021 
(2.19)** 
0.1897 
(0.41) 
0.4055 
(1.42) 
        lnHKit 1.662 
(3.85)*** 
1.1573 
(3.65)*** 
1.6359 
(5.22)*** 
1.1010 
(3.99)*** 
1.1815 
(3.08)*** 
0.4656 
(0.88) 
0.8096 
(2.54)** 
        lnPopit -1.589 
(-2.35)** 
-1.4384 
(-2.56)** 
-1.5892 
(-2.46)** 
-1.7553 
(-3.86)*** 
-1.4018 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.2449 
(-0.41) 
-1.1757 
(-3.45)*** 
        lnGovIit-1 0.3694 
(2.19)** 
0.3616 
(2.40)** 
0.3550 
(2.21)** 
0.3203 
(2.66)*** 
0.1027 
(1.18) 
0.1935 
(0.91) 
0.1508 
(1.94)* 
        lnGovCit-1 -2.411 
(-2.80)*** 
-2.164 
(-3.06)*** 
-2.366 
(-2.97)*** 
-2.0996 
(-4.11)*** 
-0.9888 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.6251 
(-1.20) 
-0.9780 
(-3.17)*** 
        lnGovTxit-1 0.1270 
(0.68) 
0.1137 
(0.67) 
0.1286 
(0.70) 
-0.0352 
(-0.26) 
-0.0193 
(-0.16) 
0.2387 
(1.08) 
0.0263 
(0.27) 
        SdInflit-1 -0.0577 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0581 
(-2.18)** 
-0.0577 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0514 
(-2.33)** 
-0.0681 
(-1.99)** 
-0.0581 
(-0.36) 
-0.0658 
(-2.41)** 
        lnX/Mit-1 0.8044 
(2.42)** 
0.7181 
(2.45)** 
0.7800 
(2.48)** 
0.5004 
(2.26)** 
0.4101 
(1.29) 
0.6157 
(1.45) 
0.1462 
(0.57) 
        D92euit -0.0007 
(-0.25) 
   0.0039 
(0.61) 
  
        D97euit  0.0054 
(2.22)** 
 0.0060 
(2.98)*** 
 0.0112 
(1.97)** 
0.0093 
(3.72)*** 
        MgMit-1   0.0012 
(0.52) 
    
        ∆lnPrivIit 0.1045 
(5.52)*** 
0.1047 
(5.59)*** 
0.1050 
(5.54)*** 
0.1025 
(7.12)*** 
0.1106 
(4.42)*** 
0.1171 
(3.77)*** 
0.1143 
(4.77)*** 
        
∆lnHKit -0.0509 
(-0.81) 
-0.0250 
(-0.40) 
-0.0541 
(-0.87) 
0.0264 
(0.49) 
-0.0784 
(-1.42) 
0.0005 
(0.01) 
-0.0668 
(-1.23) 
        
∆lnPopit 0.0116 
(0.94) 
0.0104 
(0.83) 
0.0120 
(0.96) 
0.0099 
(1.00) 
0.0155 
(1.36) 
-0.0200 
(-1.85)* 
0.0154 
(1.37) 
        
∆lnGovIit 0.0364 
(3.72)*** 
0.0372 
(3.81)*** 
0.0361 
(3.67)*** 
0.0354 
(4.28)*** 
0.0341 
(3.40)*** 
0.0357 
(2.68)*** 
0.0354 
(3.56)*** 
        
∆lnGovCit -0.2585 
(-8.08)*** 
-0.2593 
(-8.12)*** 
-0.2586 
(-8.09)*** 
-0.2618 
(-10.32)*** 
-0.1841 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.1904 
(-4.69)*** 
-0.1850 
(-5.54)*** 
        
∆lnGovTxit 0.0258 
(2.20)** 
0.0252 
(2.14)** 
0.0260 
(2.22)** 
0.0141 
(1.49) 
0.0145 
(1.37) 
0.0288 
(1.97)** 
0.0177 
(1.72) 
        
∆SdInflit 0.0001 
(0.11) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0003 
(-0.35) 
-0.0022 
(-1.12) 
0.0014 
(0.36) 
-0.0021 
(-1.09) 
        
∆lnX/Mit -0.0118 
(-0.52) 
-0.0139 
(-0.62) 
-0.0117 
(-0.52) 
-0.0154 
(-1.06) 
0.0342 
(1.29) 
0.0500 
(1.40) 
0.0286 
(1.13) 
        
        R2 0.5873 0.5913 0.5875 0.5634 0.5946 0.5030 0.6133 
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1992-2004 1997-2004 1992-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 21 21 21 21 
No. observ. 448 448 448 641 273 168 273 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; the estimated 
speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ-ln(1-ф)) is in square brackets; models estimated controlling for fixed effects (see text for 
reasons why fixed effects make more sense than random effects in this context; Hausman tests also rejected random effects, 
nevertheless, equation in column 6 was estimated by random effects because the dummy d97eu was dropped in the fixed effects 
estimation due to lack of variability). 
In all estimations the presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was controlled for by using robust standard 
errors. The long-run coefficients, their respective standard errors and t-statistics were estimated according to the relation θs=asi/фi. 
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a)  hwtc means half way to convergence and measures the time it takes to go half way to the new steady-state output per capita or the time 
it takes to reduce half of the differences in output per capita among countries; hwtc=ln(0.5)/ln(1-ф). 
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Table 4. Pooled mean group panel data estimations and robustness analysis 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        lnYit-1 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.0700 
(-6.72)*** 
[0.073] 
9.6 years 
-0.0643 
(-7.59)*** 
[0.066] 
10.4 years 
-0.0594 
(-7.87)*** 
[0.061] 
11.3 years 
-0.1726 
(-5.51)*** 
[0.1894] 
3.7 years 
-0.0377 
(-2.14)** 
[0.0384] 
18.0 years 
-0.0871 
(-3.28)*** 
[0.0911] 
7.6 years 
-0.0886 
(-1.35) 
[0.0928] 
7.5 years 
        lnPrivIit 0.5451 
(4.21)*** 
0.3551 
(3.09)*** 
0.4937 
(3.87)*** 
0.4745 
(4.48)*** 
0.5679 
(1.67)* 
1.1965 
(2.40)** 
0.2398 
(0.30) 
        lnHKit 1.2879 
(7.78)*** 
0.8142 
(3.89)*** 
1.4183 
(10.27)*** 
-0.0131 
(-0.07) 
0.8971 
(1.78)* 
-0.7826 
(-0.96) 
2.3633 
(1.59) 
        lnPopit -0.9556 
(-5.28)*** 
-1.0070 
(-4.52)*** 
-0.9183 
(-3.99)*** 
-0.4429 
(-4.78)*** 
-1.8416 
(-1.89)* 
-0.5974 
(-2.31)** 
-1.4288 
(-1.10) 
        lnGovIit-1 0.1770 
(3.14)*** 
0.2672 
(3.01)*** 
0.2120 
(3.21)*** 
0.1089 
(3.21)*** 
0.2812 
(1.29) 
0.1041 
(0.83) 
0.0407 
(0.18) 
        lnGovCit-1 -1.5428 
(-5.42)*** 
-1.5558 
(-4.36)*** 
-1.8797 
(-5.23)*** 
-0.3853 
(-2.42)** 
-1.9274 
(-1.75)* 
-0.1352 
(-0.35) 
-1.6997 
(-1.15) 
        lnGovTxit-1 0.0077 
(0.10) 
-0.0428 
(-0.43) 
0.0925 
(1.12) 
0.0187 
(0.42) 
-0.2074 
(-0.86) 
-0.0357 
(-0.22) 
-0.3744 
(-1.03) 
        SdInflit-1 -0.0421 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.0547 
(-4.34)*** 
-0.0480 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.0131 
(-0.74) 
-0.0507 
(-1.63) 
-0.0358 
(-0.78) 
-0.0531 
(-0.68) 
        lnX/Mit-1 0.1948 
(1.41) 
0.4043 
(3.17)*** 
0.3992 
(3.09)*** 
0.1634 
(1.51) 
0.7463 
(1.73)* 
0.3146 
(0.78) 
0.3369 
(0.70) 
        D92euit -0.0010 
(0.29) 
      
        D97euit  0.0087 
(4.06)*** 
 0.0101 
(5.38)*** 
   
        MgMit-1   0.0012 
(0.42) 
    
        
        R2     0.5953 0.7355 0.6172 
Log-likelihood 1472.3 1469.9 1464.2     
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1997-2004 1972-1996 1997-2004 1997-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 21 14 14 7 
No. observ. 448 448 448 168 336 112 56 
        
        
        lngdppcit-1 (b)    -0.1946 
(-2.40)** 
-0.0593 
(-2.32)** 
-0.0611 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.0592 
(-1.71)* 
d92euit (b)    0.0068 
(0.87) 
   
Time period    1992-2004 1972-1991 1992-2004 1992-2004 
No. observations    252 266 182 91 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: All equations were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant, but due to space limitations only long-
run and dummy coefficients are reported; in fact, more attention is given to the long-run coefficients because short-run 
dynamics are just used to control for annual or cyclical fluctuations in output per capita. PMG estimations are presented 
in columns 1, 2 and 3; Arellano-Bond techniques are used to estimate model 4; and a fixed effects estimator is used to 
estimate models in columns 5, 6 and 7. Robust standard errors are used to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
t-statistics are in parentheses (z-statistics for the PMG and Arellano-Bond estimations); significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.; again, the speed of convergence (λ) is in square brackets. 
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a) See Table 3. 
(b) In these lines the convergence coefficient and the coefficient on the dummy d92eu (when included in the model, instead 
of d97eu) are presented and result from a similar specification to the one above but using another time period or 
threshold; the coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 5. Results from five-year time spans estimations 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) DIF-GMM (4) SYS-GMM (5) SYS-GMM (6) 2SLS 
       lnYit-5 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.3427 
(-5.44)*** 
[0.084] 
8.3 years 
-0.3272 
(-5.15)*** 
[0.079] 
8.7 years 
-0.5334 
(-4.57)*** 
[0.152] 
4.5 years 
-0.3802 
(-3.10)*** 
[0.096] 
7.2 years 
-0.3123 
(-2.96)*** 
[0.075] 
9.3 years 
-0.2825 
(-3.67)*** 
[0.066] 
10.4 years 
       lnPrivIit 0.1935 
(2.91)*** 
0.1972 
(3.08)*** 
0.1204 
(1.10) 
0.1217 
(2.14)** 
0.1028 
(3.10)*** 
0.0859 
(1.94)* 
       lnHKit 0.3989 
(3.61)*** 
0.4586 
(6.94)*** 
0.6555 
(3.13)*** 
0.3094 
(2.88)** 
0.2658 
(2.31)** 
0.2400 
(3.01)*** 
       lnPopit -0.2443 
(-4.19)*** 
-0.2822 
(-5.32)*** 
-0.2363 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.2436 
(-5.71)*** 
-0.2296 
(-4.07)*** 
-0.2212 
(-2.73)*** 
       lnGovIit 0.0126 
(0.63) 
0.0062 
(0.31) 
-0.0290 
(-2.19)** 
0.0240 
(1.21) 
 0.0462 
(2.10)** 
       lnGovCit -0.3309 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.3429 
(-4.08)*** 
-0.3239 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.0880 
(-0.82) 
 0.1083 
(-1.52) 
 -      lnGovTxit 0.0750 
(2.25)** 
0.0769 
(2.33)** 
0.0874 
(1.57) 
-0.0282 
(-0.81) 
 0.0365 
(1.42) 
       SdInflit -0.0110 
(-1.17) 
-0.0112 
(-1.26) 
-0.0111 
(-1.36) 
-0.0100 
(-1.02) 
 -0.0108 
(-0.98) 
       lnX/Mit 0.1587 
(2.19)** 
0.1362 
(1.84*) 
0.0648 
(0.64) 
0.1689 
(2.06)* 
 0.1511 
(1.83)* 
       D96euit 0.0151 
(0.84) 
 0.0149 
(1.07) 
0.0432 
(3.47)*** 
0.0444 
(2.59)** 
0.0369 
(2.05)** 
       MgMit  0.0294 
(1.21) 
    
       
       R2 0.6115 0.6162    0.4418 
Hansen test   0.74 0.90 0.63  
       
       
       lngdppcit-5 (b) 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a)
 
-0.3251 
(-4.96)*** 
[0.079] 
8.8 years 
 -0.4606 
(-4.52)*** 
[0.123] 
5.6 years 
-0.2866 
(-1.76)* 
[0.068] 
10.3 years 
-0.2322 
(-1.81)* 
[0.053] 
13.1 years 
-0.2303 
(-3.13)*** 
[0.052] 
13.2 years 
       d91euit (b) -0.0141 
(-0.91) 
 -0.0217 
(-1.79)* 
0.0059 
(0.33) 
0.0070 
(0.49) 
-0.0010 
(-0.05) 
       
       R2 0.6114     0.3986 
Hansen test   0.70 0.92 0.65  
       
       No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
No. time periods 7 7 6 7 7 6 
No. observations 98 98 84 98 98 84 
       Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 
10%; the estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ=[-ln(1-ф)]/5) is in square brackets. In columns 1 and 2 
the model is estimated controlling for fixed effects. The instruments used for DIF-GMM are the second and third lags 
of the log of output per capita; all other right-hand-side variables are assumed exogenous and are instrumented with 
their own values; the additional instrument used in the SYS-GMM is the difference of the log of output per capita 
lagged one period. A two-stages least squares estimator is used to obtain the results presented in the column 7 (here the 
log of initial output per capita is instrumented with its second lag). The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation is controlled for by using robust standard errors. The values reported for the Hansen test are the p-
values for the null hypothesis of a valid specification. Luxembourg was excluded from the sample due to lack of 
observations for human capital. 
(a) See Table 3. 
(b) These results come from a similar specification to the one reported above in the same column but including the variable 
d91eu instead of d96eu; the coefficients on the other variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
 
 
 
